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Two  core  questions  in  the  study  of speech  evolution  are  whether  nonhuman  primate  signals  should  be
conceived  as referential,  and  what  the  role  of social  cognition  is  in  primate  communication.  Current
evidence  suggests  that  the  structure  of  primate  vocalizations  is  largely  innate  and  related  to  the  affec-
tive/motivational  state  of the  caller,  with  a probabilistic  and underdetermined  relationship  between
speciﬁc  events  and  calls.  Moreover,  nonhuman  primates  do  not  appear  to express  or  comprehend  com-
municative  or informative  intent,  which  is in line  with  a lack  of  mental  state attribution  to  others.  We
argue  that  nonhuman  primate  vocalizations  as well  as gestures  should  be best  conceived  as  goal-directed,
where  signallers  are  sensitive  to the relation  between  their  signalling  and  receivers’  responses.  Receivers
in turn  use  signals  to  predict  signaller  behaviour.  In combination  with  their  ability to  integrate  informa-
tion  from  multiple  sources,  this  renders  the  system  as  a whole  relatively  powerful,  despite  the  lack  of
higher-order  intentionality  on the  side  of sender  or receiver.ental state attribution
stensive communication
rimate communication
eferential signalling
ymbolic communication
ervet monkeys
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. The evolving language faculty
as the basis from which all other uniquely human accomplishmentsPlease cite this article in press as: Fischer, J., Price, T., Meaning, inten
Biobehav. Rev. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.10.
According to the evolutionary biologists John Maynard Smith
nd Eörs Szathmáry, the transition from primate-like calls to speech
as “the decisive step in the origin of speciﬁcally human society”
1995, p. 12), and the evolving language faculty has been proposed
∗ Corresponding author at: Cognitive Ethology Laboratory, German Primate Cen-
er, Kellnerweg 4, 37077 Göttingen, Germany.
E-mail address: jﬁscher@dpz.eu (J. Fischer).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.10.014
149-7634/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article 
/).developed (Snowdon, 2004). Despite a wide variety of scenarios
of how language might have come about, the evidence is scant,
and thus the question of language evolution has been suggested
to be one of the most difﬁcult problems in science (Christiansen
and Kirby, 2003). This encompasses both the evolution of the
representational and socio-cognitive system underpinning the lan-
guage faculty, as well as speciﬁc adaptations that facilitate differenttion, and inference in primate vocal communication. Neurosci.
014
modes of externalization, such as speech or sign language (Hagoort
and Poeppel, 2013).
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
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Although there is still no deﬁnitive list of which components
ake up the language faculty (Hauser et al., 2002), it is clear that it
s a complex trait that draws on several subcomponents, including
he ability to map  external events or objects onto conventionalized
igns, a syntactical engine to construct and comprehend the hier-
rchical structures characterizing language, as well as the ability
o attribute intentions and knowledge states to others in commu-
icative interactions (Fitch, 2010; Hauser et al., 2002; Lenneberg,
967; Scott-Phillips, 2015). Within an evolutionary framework, it
eems more likely that the emerging language faculty would have
o-opted pre-linguistic components than to evolve entirely novel
anguage-speciﬁc modules (Fitch, 2010). These pre-linguistic com-
onents can be thought of as pre-adaptations or precursors to
anguage (Hurford, 2003). Over the last decades, much research
ffort was devoted to identifying such putative pre-adaptations
r precursors in closely related species, or to investigating ana-
ogue models in more distantly related species (Hauser and Fitch,
003; Weiss and Newport, 2006). In this contribution, we review
he evidence for precursors to semantic communication and prag-
atic inference in nonhuman primate (hereafter: ‘primate’) signals,
iving special attention to the auditory-vocal domain. We  ﬁrst dis-
uss concepts of meaning and ﬂexibility in vocal production, with
pecial regard to vervet monkey alarm calls. We  then turn to the
uestion whether nonhuman primate vocal communication fulﬁls
riteria for ostensive communication, entailing the expression and
nderstanding of both communicative and informative intent. We
onclude with the suggestion that substantial parts of nonhuman
rimate signalling can best be conceived as goal-directed. In com-
ination with the inferential skills of listeners, this assumption is
ufﬁcient to explain much of the sophistication in nonhuman pri-
ate communication.
. The question of meaning in primate communication
Words have meaning in that they represent something other
han themselves (Deacon, 1997; Fitch, 2010; Hurford, 2007). It
as Paul Grice who pointed out that linguistic meaning not only
epends on the relationship between a word and what it repre-
ents (the key concept of semantics), but also on the fact that both
he signaller and the receiver take each other’s state of mind into
ccount when communicating (Grice, 1957). This led to the dis-
inction between literal meaning (the code that maps signs onto
he signiﬁed, i.e. words onto referents), and speaker or intended
eaning (Grice, 1957; Moore, 2016a; Scott-Phillips, 2015; Sperber
nd Wilson, 1986).
Semiotic theory (Chandler, 2007) provides a useful framework
or distinguishing different types of relationships between the sig-
iﬁer and the signiﬁed. This relationship can take on three different
odes, namely arbitrary, i.e. symbolic, iconic, or indexical (de
aussure, 1959). Words have symbolic meaning because the rela-
ionship between the word and that to which it refers is mostly
rbitrary and based on a set of conventional rules (Peirce, 1958).
he creation of such arbitrary relationships between the signiﬁer
nd the signiﬁed, and the resulting symbolic representations have
een put forward as a fundamental step in the evolution towards
odern human language (Christiansen and Kirby, 2003; Deacon,
997; Jackendoff, 1999). Iconic relationships in the vocal-auditory
omain (speech) often amount to onomatopoeic descriptions, such
s ‘eeyore’ for donkey. There is still some stylization and ﬂexibility
etween signiﬁer and signiﬁed here, and different languages vary
n terms of their onomatopoeic renditions of animal sounds − forPlease cite this article in press as: Fischer, J., Price, T., Meaning, inten
Biobehav. Rev. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.10.
nstance, in German “I-Aah” would be used to refer to the donkey.
ndexical relationships, ﬁnally, reﬂect some causal link between
he signiﬁer and the signiﬁed, such as smoke being indicative of
he presence of ﬁre (de Saussure, 1959). PRESS
avioral Reviews xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
3. Flexibility in vocal production
A crucial prerequisite for conventionalized communication in
speech is vocal-auditory learning, which gives rise to the open-
ended creativity and the different degrees to which speech varies
between populations, with regional differences in language type,
dialect and accent (Lameira et al., 2010). Flexibility in speech can
be attributed to the ability to modify vocal structure as a result of
auditory experience, as well as the ability to produce and respond to
words in novel contexts (Janik and Slater, 2000). The learnt acquisi-
tion of novel sounds has been identiﬁed in only a few species within
distantly related taxa, including songbirds (Doupe and Kuhl, 1999;
Wilbrecht and Nottebohm, 2003), marine mammals (Janik, 1997;
Nottebohm, 1972) and elephants (Poole et al., 2005). Primates are
notably absent from this group (Egnor and Hauser, 2004), as they
acquire species-typical vocalisations even when deprived of nor-
mal  auditory experience by social isolation (Winter et al., 1973),
deafness (Hammerschmidt et al., 2001, 2000), or cross-fostering
(Owren et al., 1992). In humans, the ability to exercise voluntary
control over the spectral patterning of words and the production of
novel sounds depends on a direct connection between the primary
motor cortex and the nucleus ambiguous, which in turn controls the
laryngeal motoneurons (Kuypers, 1958); a similar direct connec-
tion is found between forebrain motor areas and neurones which
control syringeal movements in songbirds (Wild, 1993). This con-
nection is missing in primate vocal production (Jürgens, 1976),
a difference that likely accounts for nonhuman primates’ inabil-
ity to produce calls outside of the species-typical vocal repertoire
(Jürgens, 2009). Interestingly, this direct connection is not involved
in the production of human non-verbal sounds, such as laughs,
cries and shrieks; thus at the neurological level, animal calls appear
more similar to this group of innate vocalisations than to speech
(Ackermann et al., 2014; Hage, 2010). A recent study suggests
that one route towards higher control of vocal output may  be the
strengthening of existing weaker projections: while the structural
network of the laryngeal motor cortex (LMC) in humans and rhe-
sus monkeys is largely comparable, humans have a much higher
connectivity (Kumar et al., 2016). It should be noted at this point
that most of the neurobiological evidence comes from a few more
distantly related species only (mostly squirrel monkeys and rhesus
monkeys, respectively), while comparatively little is known about
the functional connectivity in apes, for instance.
Further support for the idea that in terms of their structure, pri-
mate vocalizations reveal little ﬂexibility comes from comparative
analyses of the call structure of closely related species. For instance,
the ‘barks’ of male members of the genus Chlorocebus revealed only
minor differences between East African and South African vervets
(Fig. 1; Price et al., 2014). These monkeys belong to two differ-
ent subspecies of Chlorocebus pygerythrus, and the split between
the two  lineages is assumed to have taken place around 1.5 mya
(Perelman et al., 2011). Remarkably, males of the West African con-
gener C. sabaeus also exhibit a highly similar call structure; with a
last common ancestor between the two  species around 2.1 mya.
Such comparative studies strongly suggest that the structure of
nonhuman primate vocalizations is not only innate, but also highly
conserved (Geissmann, 1984; Meyer et al., 2012; Thinh et al., 2011).
Nonetheless, there are notable changes in the structure of pri-
mate vocalizations during ontogeny, but these are most likely the
result of maturational development such as growth and the onset
of puberty (Ey et al., 2007; Hammerschmidt et al., 2000; Lieblich
et al., 1980). It is also clear that there is some ﬂexibility in call
usage (Hage et al., 2013). For instance, the presence or identitytion, and inference in primate vocal communication. Neurosci.
014
of other individuals in the vicinity may  affect the incidence of
call production (Gyger et al., 1986; le Roux et al., 2008; Evans
and Marler, 1994; Di Bitetti, 2005), a phenomenon known as an
“audience effect” (Seyfarth and Cheney, 2010; Zuberbühler, 2008).
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Fig. 1. Scatterplot and spectrograms illustrating population differences in the
acoustic structure of C. sabaeus, C. p.hilgerti, and C. p. pygerythrus barks. The scat-
terplot presents the distribution of the ﬁrst and second LDA discriminant scores.
Spectrograms illustrate a typical call exemplar for each call group, with typical
calls deﬁned as those that were most likely to be assigned by LDA to the correct
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rom Price et al. (2014), with permission.
n addition, detailed acoustic analyses revealed that the struc-
ure of primate vocalizations may  undergo social modiﬁcation (e.g.
lowson and Snowdon, 1994; Mitani and Gros-Louis, 1998), a pro-
ess described by Seyfarth and Cheney as “modiﬁcation within
onstraints” (1997). Further, baboons systematically altered the
ength of their contact calls (grunts) in relation to the visibility
n the habitat (Ey et al., 2009). The neural mechanisms underly-
ng such vocal accommodation are, however, not well understood
Hammerschmidt and Fischer, 2008). One possibility is that via
ensory-motor integration, auditory experience shifts probabilities
n pattern generation (Fischer, 2008), but this conjecture requires
mpirical testing.
In sum, the structure of primate vocalizations is largely hard-
ired. There is some evidence for modest vocal accommodation,
ut it appears that nonhuman primates do not acquire novel
earned voiced vocalizations (Fischer, 2002). The core conclusion
f this is that the calls of nonhuman primates are neither iconic nor
ymbolic, but can be best conceived as indexical. The question now
s: of what may  they be indexical?
. The case of vervet monkey alarm calls
Initially, primate calls were conceived as expressions of emo-
ions, as Darwin had suggested (Darwin, 1872). This view was
idely shared (Premack, 1975; Rowell and Hinde, 1962; Scherer
nd Kappas, 1988). Yet, some primate calls, notably alarm and food
alls given in response to speciﬁc stimuli in the environment, raised
he intriguing question whether they might have some symbolic or
eferential quality (Marler, 1977). The paradigmatic case in this dis-
ussion is the alarm call system of vervet monkeys (Seyfarth et al.,
980a,b). In response to their three main predator categories (large
ats such as leopards, aerial predators such as martial eagles, and
nakes, such as pythons), vervet monkeys evolved different adap-Please cite this article in press as: Fischer, J., Price, T., Meaning, inten
Biobehav. Rev. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.10.
ive escape strategies and they also utter acoustically distinct calls
n these contexts (Seyfarth et al., 1980a,b). Previous studies in cap-
ivity had found structural differences between female alarm calls
roduced to snakes and eagles (Owren and Bernacki, 1988), yet a PRESS
avioral Reviews xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 3
detailed quantitative assessment of the acoustic properties of these
calls was notably absent from the literature.
To study the properties of the vervet monkey alarm call system
in detail, we  re-analyzed the original recordings assembled by Tom
Struhsaker, Robert Seyfarth and Dorothy Cheney (Price, 2013; Price
et al., 2015). We  used alarm calls given in response to the differ-
ent predator categories, but also included calls given during inter-
and intra-group aggressive interactions. Because of the substantial
differences between male and female vocalizations, we analysed
their calls separately (Price et al., 2015). The ﬁrst goal was to assess
whether any objective call types could be identiﬁed, without any
reference to the context in which the respective calls were given. If
the calls given in the different contexts were indeed highly acous-
tically distinct, one would have predicted the emergence of three
alarm call types, as well as one or two  call types encompassing
calls given in aggressive interactions. The ‘best’ solutions were a
4-cluster solution for the females (Fig. 2a), and a 3-cluster solution
for the males. The clusters largely corresponded to previous verbal
and spectrographic descriptions of the calls (Seyfarth et al., 1980a;
Struhsaker, 1967), but also indicated some overlap between dif-
ferent call types. For females, one cluster corresponded to ‘chirp’
calls, typically given in response to terrestrial predators, one clus-
ter encompassed broadband ‘chutter’ calls typically produced in
response to snakes, but also during intergroup encounters (see also
Cheney, 1984), while a third cluster corresponded to the low fre-
quency ‘rraup’ calls typically produced in response to raptors, but
also during escalated between and within-group aggression (Price
et al., 2015). The ﬁnal cluster fell in between cluster 2 and 3, indi-
cating graded variation between ‘chutter’ and ‘rraup’ calls. For East
African male alarm calls, the three clusters largely corresponded to
male ‘chutters’ given in response to snakes, ‘barks’ given in response
to terrestrial predators, and ‘rraup’ calls given in response to eagles
and snakes (Price et al., 2015). No recordings of calls given during
aggressive interactions were available.
The corresponding discriminant function analysis revealed that
the female alarm calls could be very well assigned to the different
contexts, with an average of 98.7% correct classiﬁcation (Fig. 2b).
When we included calls given during aggressive interactions, a
higher number of misclassiﬁcations occurred. Speciﬁcally, calls
given during within- and between-group aggression were confused
with calls given in eagle and snake contexts. Calls given in response
to leopards, however, were clearly distinct. In contrast, ‘chutters’
and ‘rraups’ belonged to one larger category with continuous gra-
dation (Fig. 2c; Price et al., 2015).
The calls that male vervet monkeys gave in response to the
different predator categories were also clearly distinguishable,
yielding 93.2% correct classiﬁcation. We  added a further analy-
sis of calls recorded from vervet monkey males ranging in South
Africa, which had been given in response to leopards and during
aggressive interactions between groups. These calls were difﬁcult
to distinguish, with a correct classiﬁcation of 74.9%, which was not
signiﬁcantly different from chance, as evidenced by a permutation
analysis (Price et al., 2015). The key conclusion of this analysis was
that the alarm calls of East African vervet monkeys are acousti-
cally sufﬁciently distinct to allow for discrimination of these calls
in predator contexts. When calls from aggressive contexts were
included into the analysis, then some misclassiﬁcation could be
observed for ‘chutter’ and ‘rraup’ calls from female monkeys, and
between barks from South African male vervets.
By now, acoustic variation with different predator types has
been found in many animal species, including birds, carnivores
and of course other primate species (e.g., Evans et al., 1993; Gilltion, and inference in primate vocal communication. Neurosci.
014
and Sealy, 2004; Kirchhof and Hammerschmidt, 2006; Macedonia,
1990; Manser et al., 2002; Slobodchikoff, 2002; Zuberbühler, 2001).
To a lesser extent, variation in calls has been observed between con-
texts of food discovery (Clay et al., 2012; Kalan and Boesch, 2015)
Please cite this article in press as: Fischer, J., Price, T., Meaning, intention, and inference in primate vocal communication. Neurosci.
Biobehav. Rev. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.10.014
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Fig. 2. Structure and discriminability of female vervet vocalizations given in alarm and aggressive contexts. (A) Scatter plot of the four identiﬁed clusters based on discriminant
function analyses using cluster membership as grouping variable. Spectrograms depict representative call exemplars with a small Euclidean distance to the cluster centre
for  each cluster. (B) Scatter plot of the discriminant scores with corresponding spectrograms of female alarm calls given in response to leopards, eagles, and snakes. (C)
Scatter  plot of the discriminant scores with corresponding spectrograms of female alarm calls given in response to leopards, eagles, and snakes, as well as during within-
and  between-group aggression. All spectrograms were made using the following settings in Avisoft: 256 FFT, frame size of 100% (Hamming window), frequency resolution
172  Hz; 50% window overlap, temporal resolution 2.9 ms.  Abbreviations: kHz: Kiloherz, s: seconds, DF1: discriminant function 1, DF2: discriminant function 2.
Figure and ﬁgure legend from Price et al. (2015), published under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
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nd during social interactions (Faragó et al., 2010; Gouzoules et al.,
984; Semple et al., 2002; Struhsaker, 2010). Such context-speciﬁc
alls have been proposed to be precursors to human words (Fedurek
nd Slocombe, 2011; Townsend and Manser, 2013; Zuberbühler,
003).
We  argue, however, that context-speciﬁcity is not equivalent
o ﬂexibility in mapping of sound and referent (here: different
redator or food types). In fact, one could conceive a com-
letely hard-wired system where speciﬁc releasers invariably
ive rise to highly speciﬁc responses, such as the responses of
emale bush crickets to male song of the species (Heller and
on Helversen, 1986). In other words, context-speciﬁcity per se,
 key criterion in the identiﬁcation of so-called referential com-
unication (Macedonia and Evans, 1993; Townsend and Manser,
013; Wheeler and Fischer, 2012), is a poor diagnostic to estab-
ish whether such calls might constitute preadaptations to human
peech. The crucial question is what the mechanisms are that medi-
te the link between the occurrence of a certain event, and the
tterance of a speciﬁc call.
. What do primate vocalizations stand for?
In the case of alarm calls, there is a relationship between the
ccurrence of a speciﬁc event, such as the appearance of a predator,
nd the utterance of certain calls. The available evidence suggests
hat this relationship is not deterministic (Seyfarth and Cheney,
997). First of all, the assessment of a given situation may  change
ith experience, altering the link between the event and the call-
ng. For instance, young vervet monkeys spontaneously produce
aerial alarm calls’ to a number of items in the air or falling down,
ut they subsequently learn to recognize that only speciﬁc species
ose a danger, such that they restrict the calling to speciﬁc raptor
pecies (Seyfarth and Cheney, 1980). Similarly, chacma baboons,
apio ursinus, in the Okavango delta, who for the ﬁrst time spotted
lephants, started to alarm call, but rapidly learned that elephants
ose no danger to them, and subsequently remained silent (much
o the chagrin of the researchers who would have appreciated being
lerted to the presence of elephants in the area; D. Cheney, personal
ommunication). These examples indicate that perceptual learning
nd learning through experience modify the relationship between
n event and the production of a given signal. The more fundamen-
al question is how we can best explain the cognitive and emotional
rocesses that lead to calling, once the stimulus in the environment
as been evaluated.
Initially, the vervet alarm calls were presumed to refer to the
liciting stimuli because of the presumed patterning of speciﬁc
alls with speciﬁc predators (Seyfarth et al., 1980a; Fig. 3a). What
as not fully appreciated was that similar calls could be given in
pparently different contexts (Price et al., 2015, Fig. 3b), and that
ometimes, different calls could be given in the same situation
Struhsaker, 1967). Presently, it remains unclear whether similar
alls are tied to similar or perhaps also different internal states
f the animals. In one scenario, different perceptions of the world
ay  elicit similar internal states, which in turn elicit speciﬁc calls
Fig. 3c). In an alternative scenario, different perceptions lead to
ifferent internal states; these converge onto the same pattern
enerators and hence calls (Fig. 3d).
By analysing the animals’ overt behaviour, it is difﬁcult to distin-
uish between accounts c and d in Fig. 3 (or yet another model). Yet,
t should be noted that internal states may  be quite differentiated,
nd that the structure of vocalizations allow for subtle variationsPlease cite this article in press as: Fischer, J., Price, T., Meaning, inten
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ith regards to different aspects of internal states. Todt (1986), for
xample, proposed that the internal state consisted of an affective
omponent related to the individual’s evaluation of the environ-
ent, a motivational component related to the individual’s action PRESS
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tendencies, and an arousal component related to the individual’s
likelihood and urgency to respond. In other words, the emotions
reﬂect whether some event is pleasurable or aversive (associated
with positive or negative internal reward), while arousal may be
high or low, irrespective of the evaluation of the situation. The moti-
vation is linked to the idea to fulﬁl certain needs—at the most basic
level, to ensure homeostasis. This conception is broadly compatible
with appraisal theories of emotion (Arnold, 1960; Lazarus, 1966).
Within the framework of appraisal theories, emotional responses
encompass the appraisal of the environment (indicated by the men-
tal representation in Fig. 3), the individual’s motivational state
(readiness to act), peripheral physiology (e.g. hormonal and ner-
vous system changes, likely related to caller arousal), expressive
behaviour (e.g. vocalisations), and feeling (subjective experience;
for more detail see Moors et al., 2013). Because we  are here con-
cerned with emotional states in animals rather than humans, our
use of the term emotion does not imply feelings in the sense of sub-
jective and conscious experiences, but rather in the sense of basic
emotional urges (Panksepp, 2011). The question is whether these
conceptions of internal states are useful for assessing how events
are related to vocal output.
A link between speciﬁc call types and internal state was estab-
lished in squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus), which were trained
to increase or avoid electric stimulation of speciﬁc brain areas
by switching between different compartments in a cage (Jürgens,
1979). Situations in which the monkeys avoided stimulation (and
which were hence deemed to be aversive) were predictably asso-
ciated with speciﬁc call types, namely shriek cackles, shrieks and
alarm peeps (Jürgens, 1979). In contrast, in situations that were
deemed as pleasurable, the monkeys uttered twitters, groans, and
chucks (Jürgens, 1979). These calls are typically given in appetitive
situations, such as food contexts. The results support the view that
calls are loosely tied to different affective or motivational states.
Unfortunately, the relations between internal state and vocal
output are not always clear-cut. For instance, in the self-stimulation
study (Jürgens, 1979), the stimulation of the same brain area could
evoke different call types. Similarly, Struhsaker had noted that in
response to eagles, the animals would sometimes utter a broad
array of different calls (Struhsaker, 1967). Thus, the same internal
state may  ultimately activate different pattern generators, albeit
only to a certain degree, because otherwise, the signals would lose
their predictive value. The neurological studies by Jürgens (see
Jürgens, 2009, 1998 for reviews) suggest that the periaqueductal
grey (PAG) functions as an important relay-station. It is conceiv-
able that modulation at the level of the PAG explain the variation
in calling within the same context to a certain degree. Nevertheless,
we still do not fully understand the link between certain percep-
tions of the world, associated internal states, and the resulting vocal
behaviour. Thus, it is presently not possible to falsify the hypothesis
that internal states are driving the variation in animal vocaliza-
tions. Perhaps integrated analyses of remote measures of heart rate
and vocal behaviour provide ﬁrst glimpses into this link; yet more
detailed analyses of the neural and physiological foundations of
vocalizations are certainly needed to achieve a better approxima-
tion of the foundations of call production.
There is also ample evidence that variation in arousal (as
inferred from the behaviour of the subject, or by variation of
stimulus onset or stimulus distance) is related to variation in
acoustics structure within call types. With increasing arousal, calls
are typically increase in length and rate, and become noisier,
higher-pitched, and more variable (Briefer, 2012; Scherer et al.,
2003). Correlations such as these have been found in red-frontedtion, and inference in primate vocal communication. Neurosci.
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lemurs, Eulemur fulvus (Fichtel and Hammerschmidt, 2002), squir-
rel monkeys (Fichtel et al., 2001), common marmosets, Callithrix
jacchus (Yamaguchi et al., 2010), Barbary macaques, Macaca syl-
vanus (Fischer et al., 1995), chacma baboons (Meise et al., 2011)
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Fig. 3. Different conceptions between the link of external events, putative mental representations and affective evaluations, and speciﬁc vocalizations. (a) Earlier ideas about
vervet monkey alarm calls implied that speciﬁc stimuli (Eagle, Snake, Leopard) in the environment evoked corresponding mental representations, which in turn activated
speciﬁc  pattern generators (PG), resulting in the production of speciﬁc call types. (b) Similar calls may  be given in different contexts, however. It is conceivable that these
different events lead to different mental representations, which activate the same PG. (c) The occurrence of the same calls in different situations could be due to the fact that
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nd chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes;  Slocombe and Zuberbühler,
007). Similar results were found in studies of human vocalisations
reviewed in Scherer, 1989) and in a number of species outside
f the primate taxon (Esch et al., 2009; Soltis et al., 2005; Taylor
t al., 2009; Theis et al., 2007), indicating that comparable effects of
aller arousal on call structure are widespread at least in terrestrial
ammals.
For the present purposes, that is, what kind of information is
vailable to receivers, we  may  summarize that some call types
roadly correspond to (presumed) internal states, but that there is
o one-to-one mapping between events in the environment and
peciﬁc calls, and perhaps also not between speciﬁc presumed
nternal states and speciﬁc calls. Therefore, one may  conclude
hat the code in nonhuman primate communication is underde-
ermined, and the relationships between event and signal, or state
nd signal is of statistical nature. This poses speciﬁc challenges to
he receivers (see Section 7).
. Intentional signaling
In (adult) human communication, the same utterance can
ake several different meanings, depending on the constellation
etween the speaker and the hearer. For instance, if a man  tells
is partner “you look great”, the meaning of the sentence is not
o much that the partner looks great, but rather that he thinks
hat the partner looks great and that he intends that the partner
hould know this. Linguistic pragmatics can be described as the
tudy of such intended and/or inferred meaning (Fitch, 2010). APlease cite this article in press as: Fischer, J., Price, T., Meaning, inten
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econd form of inference, which we will refer to as “contextual
ragmatics”, encapsulates that receivers may  use contextual cues
o disambiguate the meaning (in the loose sense) of signals, both
n animal and in human communication (Wheeler et al., 2011). Anich in turn activate speciﬁc PGs. (d) Finally, different situations may evoke different
to the same PGs. Abbreviations: MR:  mental representation; PG: Pattern generator,
h: Chutter; B: Bark.
example of such inference in human communication is the utter-
ance “the chicken is ready to eat”; whereby the inferred meaning
of this phrase would likely be different if the speaker was walk-
ing into the garden with a bag of chicken feed in their hand than
if they were speaking whilst taking a roast chicken out of the oven
(an elaboration of the distinction between speaker’s (or utterer’s)
meaning, i.e. what a speaker seeks to communicate, and sentence-
meaning, i.e. what a sentence is conventionally used to mean can
be found in Grice, 1968). We argue that in terms of linguistic prag-
matics, humans differ from other animals both in terms of code and
socio-cognitive skills, whilst there is greater continuity in terms of
contextual pragmatics.
As discussed above, there is no conventionalized code in primate
vocal behaviour, and one hotly debated question is whether such a
code could only have arisen if the socio-cognitive abilities required
for intentional communication had evolved ﬁrst. A broad and fre-
quently used deﬁnition of intentional signalling (e.g. Tomasello
et al., 1997) encompasses the following criteria: (i) ‘means-end dis-
sociation’ (Bruner, 1981), which entails that different signals may
be used to achieve the same goal, while the same signal may  be used
to accomplish different goals; (ii) ‘persistence of the goal’, which
means that the sender may  either continue to use the same signal or
may  alter her signalling if the desired result cannot be achieved; (iii)
sensitivity to the social context, i.e. consideration of the receiver’s
attentional state; and (iv) ﬂexibility in terms of signal combination.
Several studies have by now shown that ape gestural communica-
tion fulﬁls these criteria (e.g. Liebal et al., 2004; Pika et al., 2005,
2003). Notably, monkey communication may  also meet these crite-
ria, and this may also include the vocal domain. Barbary macaques,tion, and inference in primate vocal communication. Neurosci.
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for instance, use the same call type in different contexts, while in
one context, different call types may  be uttered (Hammerschmidt
and Fischer, 1998); a subject using a raised-eyebrows threat stare
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rst waits for a response and when no submissive signal is pro-
uced by the target, or the target does not give way, the threat
ay  be escalated in several steps, including round open-mouth
hreat, head-bob, and ground-slap (Hesler and Fischer, 2007). Fur-
hermore, the monkeys are sensitive to the attentional state of the
eceiver (N. Hesler, J. Fischer, unpubl. data). Yet, all we can con-
lude from such form of intentional communication is that it is
pparently directed at a speciﬁc receiver, and goal-directed in the
ense that the animal is sensitive to the outcome, as well as sen-
itive to the relationship between its action and the outcome. This
ould amount to ﬁrst-order intentionality (Dennett, 1971), whilst
here is no need to invoke an intention to inform the signaller (i.e.,
econd-order intentionality).
Bar-On (2013) maintains that “expressive signals draw atten-
ion to the animal’s psychological state expressed, while at the
ame time drawing attention to some external object or event at
hich the state is directed” (p. 356), and argues that these kinds
f expressive signals may  constitute an important stepping-stone
n the evolution of more sophisticated intentional communica-
ion. According to Bar-On, a variety of different displays fall under
his umbrella term, including “alarm, distress and food calls, but
lso other vocalizations, such as yelps and growls, screams, pant
oots, barks, and grooming and reconciliation grunts. Further-
ore, it encompasses non-vocal behaviors such as teeth-barings,
ail-waggings, head tilts, ﬂipper ﬂaps, lip smacks, ground slaps,
ood-begging gestures, ‘play faces’ and play bows, grimaces, threat
estures, eyebrow ﬂashes, and so on.” (p. 353). But this raises the
uestion where one would draw the line between signals that do
erve an expressive function and those that do not. The idea that
ignals, which are related to some external object or event, provide
eceivers with a different inferential problem than those that are
imply used to broadcast signaller quality, is worthwhile pursuing,
owever.
Building on Grice (1957), Sperber and Wilson (1986), and
omasello (2008), Scott-Phillips (2015) argued that the crucial step
n language evolution was the development of ‘ostensive’ commu-
ication, in which both communicative and informative intent and
he recognition of this intent must be fulﬁlled. One example that
s chosen to illustrate ostensive communication is a situation in
hich the signaller is sitting in a café, and ﬁrst makes eye con-
act with the waiter, and then tilts her empty cup “in a particular,
stensive, way” (p. 9, italics in the original) to indicate that the
up is empty and that she desires a reﬁll (Scott-Phillips, 2015).
ollowing Scott-Phillips (2015), the expression of an informative
ntention needs to be accompanied by an expression of commu-
icative intention; otherwise communication would not take place.
hus, humans mark that they are intending to communicate, and
rovide information with the intent to alter the hearer’s mental
tate, under the assumption that the hearer understands both the
ommunicative and informative intention. This form of commu-
ication requires 4th order mental representation. Scott-Phillips
2015) suggests that only humans possess a speciﬁc cognitive mod-
le that supports the processing of these levels in a fast and efﬁcient
ay, but studies that systematically address this assertion in other
pecies are still lacking.
But how do we distinguish between such a rich account that
ncludes informative and communicative intent, as outlined above
n the example of the customer tilting his empty cup in a café,
nd a much simpler one? One might describe the same scene in
ompletely different terms, namely, that the signaller is entirely
naware or ignorant of the mental state of the waiter, and simply
as learnt that she gets a reﬁll when she tilts the cup, but only ifPlease cite this article in press as: Fischer, J., Price, T., Meaning, inten
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he previously had made eye contact with the waiter. For infant
nd animal researchers, reasoning about the role of mental state
ttribution in communication by way of introspection (“I know
hat you know that I know.  . .”  etc.) is prohibitive. Instead, we need PRESS
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to identify behavioural criteria to decide whether a speciﬁc signal
was given intentionally (Moore, 2016a), as a result of associative
learning, or innate dispositions.
Moore (2016a) argues that some great ape gestures fulﬁl simpler
criteria for ostensive communication. He maintains that chim-
panzees deliberately address their signals to a given receiver as
a means of indicating their communicative goals (Moore, 2016a).
Whether one subscribes to this view depends on which evidence
is taken as sufﬁcient. If we accept that making eye contact before
gesturing (or vocalizing) as a behavioural criterion for ostensive
communication, then one might conclude that signallers indeed
mark their communicative intent. Whether or not that makes them
Gricean communicators is a different question, however. As noted
above, a simpler explanation might be that the signalling behaviour
of these animals is goal-oriented, and that the animals have learned
that they need to establish eye contact before gesturing, other-
wise they would not be able to achieve their goals. Other authors
have discussed whether the play-bow of dogs (Fitch, 2015) should
be viewed as an ostensive signal. Although intuitively appealing,
the more parsimonious explanation is that the play-bow simply
signals the motivation to play, and not the motivation to commu-
nicate that the animal intends to play. Another interesting display
is the ‘head-bob’ that monkeys make when they detect a poten-
tially threatening stimulus. Typically from up in a tree, they stare
intently at the predator (or human observer), drawing attention to
themselves, but also apparently signalling to the predator that it has
been detected (pers. observation). But then again, this signal may
simply have evolved because it beneﬁts the signallers to employ it,
or because they have learnt that it functions to deter the predator
from pursuit (which is now recognized as one important function
of alarm calling in many animal species who are faced with stealth
predators; Tilson and Norton, 1981; Zuberbühler et al., 1999).
A more complicated case is the class of signals known as
“attention-getters”, which signallers use to direct another subject’s
attention to herself. One interpretation is that these signals simply
function to manipulate the receiver’s attention, without ascribing
communicative intent (Scott-Phillips, 2015). An alternative view
is that they are indeed expressions of such intent (Bourjade et al.,
2014). One example: before hamadryas baboons, P. hamadryas, take
off from the sleeping site in the morning, males within a subgroup
may  stalk towards another male in a stylized fashion, then turn
around and walk away, while glancing back over the shoulder.
This behaviour is known as ‘notifying behaviour’ in the literature
(Kummer, 1968). The traditional interpretation is that in this way,
the male is aiming to initiate group movement, and is indicating
his preferred direction. While it is clear that this behaviour can
function to achieve this goal, it is unclear whether the signaller is
indicating both his communicative (stalking) as well as informa-
tive (choosing a speciﬁc direction) intent. A more compelling albeit
anecdotal case is from a study in captive olive baboons, P. anubis,  in
which we investigated whether the monkeys would aim to capture
the attention of an ignorant observer and point out the location
of a hidden food reward (Schmitt et al., 2012). Although the vast
majority of monkeys in this study did not appear to comprehend
the task, one male baboon approached an ignorant experimenter
with the species-typical notifying behaviour, and after successfully
drawing her attention, stretched out his hand towards the bucket
that contained the food. This could be taken as evidence for Gricean
communication, in the sense that the animal is expressing his com-
municative and his informative intention (note that not all authors
use the terms consistently—see Moore, 2016b). Yet, perhaps the
stretched-out hand is just a result of the animal’s desire to reachtion, and inference in primate vocal communication. Neurosci.
014
the food, or to coax the experimenter to hand the food, i.e. a direc-
tive signal. Similarly, Bourjade and colleagues studied the begging
behaviour of captive Olive baboons and found that the animals used
more auditory attention-getters when the experimenter was fac-
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ng away, before they stretched out their hands to request food
Bourjade et al., 2014). Again, however, one would need to rule out
hat this behaviour is a result of operant conditioning.
Two studies in chimpanzees explicitly tested whether the sub-
ects altered their signalling behaviour in relation to the knowledge
tate of their audience (Crockford et al., 2012; Schel et al., 2013).
oth studies involved placing a model snake near the traveling
ath of the animals. Crockford et al. (2012) focused on the question
hether a subject that was traveling ahead of the others would pro-
uce ‘alert hoos’ when ignorant party members arrived. Receivers
ad either seen the snake and heard the initial alarm hoos, or had
nly heard the alarm hoos, or were entirely ignorant when they
pproached the scene. While the propensity to alert others was
igher when receivers had not seen the snake compared to when
hey had, this difference might be explained by variation in receiver
ehaviour. There were only very few cases in the critical third
ondition where ignorant subjects approached a knowledgeable
ignaller, however. Schel et al. (2013) found that chimpanzees that
ad detected a model snake were more likely to produce ‘alarm
oos’ and ‘waa barks’ when close allies arrived than when oth-
rs approached; they also reported gaze alternation between the
ocation of the snake and the newly arrived individual, which the
uthors took as an indicator of intentional signalling (Schel et al.,
013). Thus, there is some indication that chimpanzees are sensi-
ive to the knowledge state of the receiver, but an alternative view
s that the chimpanzees resumed calling, or switched from ‘alarm
oos’ to ‘waa barks’ following the arrival of close allies was  medi-
ted by a higher arousal in these animals’ presence. Similarly, the
aze alternation could be a result of the signaller’s motivation to
onitor both the snake’s movement as well as the behaviour of the
ewly arrived animals.
. Primate signals are goal-directed but not intentional
We  suggest that primate signals should be best conceived as
oal-directed. The signallers’ goal is to evoke speciﬁc responses
n receivers, and they are sensitive to the question whether
heir actions (the signalling) has the desired effect, such as come
ither, or go away. Because primate signals are often directed,
uman observers may  be inclined to assume communicative intent,
lthough this is not strictly necessary. The more parsimonious
xplanation is that signals provide information about the signaller’s
otivation to engage in a speciﬁc behaviour, such as play, attack,
r mate. In other words, signallers communicate, but they do not
ommunicate that they communicate.
What about receivers? As we have seen above, the ‘code’ in
rimate vocal (and possibly gestural) communication is under-
etermined and of probabilistic rather than deterministic nature.
hus, receivers may  need to take into account further information
o disambiguate situations in which the information that can be
leaned from the signal alone is not sufﬁcient to infer the signaller’s
ntentions, or predict upcoming events. Fischer (2013) suggested
o distinguish between the interpretation of the call and the subse-
uent decision making process. There is now ample evidence that
rimates take further contextual information into account when
esponding to signals (Arnold and Zuberbühler, 2013; Price and
ischer, 2014; Rendall et al., 1999; Wheeler and Hammerschmidt,
013); furthermore, primates consider signaller reliability (Cheney
nd Seyfarth, 1988), as well as sequential information (Arnold
nd Zuberbühler, 2008) to infer what the signals predict or stand
or. In principle, such additional information may  affect both thePlease cite this article in press as: Fischer, J., Price, T., Meaning, inten
Biobehav. Rev. (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.10.
nterpretation of the call as well as the decision-making process,
ia shifting cost-beneﬁt functions of different behavioural strate-
ies. In contrast, there is little evidence that the attribution of call
eaning is inﬂuenced by any concept of signaller intentions. Thus, PRESS
avioral Reviews xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
receivers’ responses may be termed inferential (Fitch, 2015), but
not ‘ostensive-inferential’ in the sense that receivers would attend
to the communicative or informational intent of the signaller (if
it existed). In this sense, we agree with Dorit Bar-On that primate
receivers are not ‘fulﬁlling their half of the Gricean equation’ (contra
Fitch, 2010). In conclusion, a sparse model of primate communica-
tion comprises goal-directed signalling with a high sensitivity to
receivers’ imminent responses, as well as receivers that recognize
the sender’s signals as such, and that possess a powerful inferential
machinery to integrate multiple sources of information.
From an evolutionary point of view, a question is whether
there is selective pressure to consider the intended meaning in the
ﬁrst place. As long as signals are reliably associated with speciﬁc
behaviours, or reliably predict the occurrence of speciﬁc events, it
is sufﬁcient to attend to the signal and make inferences about what
it predicts. This may  challenge the view of ‘fully blown mental state
attribution ﬁrst’, because its presence is not needed to explain the
emergence of a functionally adequate system for communication
in primates.
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